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Abstract Market-based solutions to climate change are widely advocated by financial actors
and policy makers in order to foster a smooth transition to a low-carbon economy. A first
important limiting factor to this approach is widely recognized to be the imperfect information
on investors’ portfolios’ exposure to climate-related risks. While better disclosure of climate-
relevant information is often recommended as a remedy, the current lack of concise and
comparable measures of portfolios’ exposure to climate risk fails to provide major investors
with the full incentives to reallocate their portfolios. A second limiting factor arises from the
fact that in the context of the low-carbon transition, it is not clear how to measure the market
share of participants because many economic sectors produce greenhouse gases (GHG)
emissions or induce them along the supply chain. The lack of common and concise measures
of the relevant market share hampers the ability of policy makers to ensure fair competition
policies and the ability of major investors to assess the effects of their own and their
competitors’ portfolio reallocation. To address these two gaps, we propose two novel and
complementary indices: (i) the BGHG exposure,^ capturing the exposure of single investors’
portfolios to climate transition risks, and (ii) BGHG holding,^ capturing the market share of
each financial actor weighted by its contribution to GHG emissions. We illustrate the use of the
indices on a dataset of portfolios of equity holdings and loans in the Euro-Area, and we discuss
the policy implications for the low-carbon transition.
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1 Introduction
Both business and financial actors, and policy makers have been increasingly advocating for
market-based solutions to climate change. While the imperfect information on investors’
portfolios’ exposure to climate-related risks is usually recognized as an important limiting
factor to a market-based approach (Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986),
better disclosure of climate-relevant information is recommended as a remedy: Bgiven the right
information, investors are expected to deliver the best climate solutions^ (Carney and
Bloomberg 2016). At this regard, the G20’s Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclo-
sures (TCFD), created by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), highlighted the need for more
transparency regarding companies and financial actors’ exposure to investments contributing
to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the need for tools to assess risks and opportunities
related to climate change (FSB TCFD 2017).
On the one hand, climate risk could materialize as a consequence of damages to physical
assets, natural capital, and/or human lives as a result of climate-induced extreme weather
events (IPCC 2014). In case of failure to meet the 2°C target, climate risks could materialize
for many investors as well as affect negatively GDP, governments’ budgets, and, indirectly,
sovereign bond values. The entity of the global climate BValue-at-Risk^ due to climate-
induced physical damages has been estimated by Dietz et al. (2016) in approximately 24.2
trillion (trn) USD of lost financial assets. However, at the level of individual assets and
portfolios, the lack of information on climate risk prevents investors from proper risk pricing.
On the other hand, climate risks could also result from the transition to a low-carbon
economy (i.e., transition risk, ESRB 2016; Batten et al. 2016). In this context, there are at least
three sources of shocks that could limit the ability of market participants to fully anticipate
price adjustments of carbon-intense assets. The first source is technological shocks - e.g., a fast
decrease in renewable energy production costs can create or destroy value in the fossil fuels
and in the renewable energy sectors, respectively (Unruh 2000; Foxon 2006). The second
source is scientific discovery shocks - e.g., the new evidence on methane emissions from
permafrost thaw, suggesting a possible acceleration of CO2 concentration growth (Anthony
et al. 2016); or the new evidence that current climate measures to limit global warming agreed
at COP21 would still fail to reach the 2°C target (Rogelj et al. 2016). The third source is
climate policy shocks - e.g., the success in reaching an agreement at COP21 came as a surprise
to many observers, while the 2017 position of the US administration towards climate change
would have not been correctly predicted by most observers in 2016. Many recent studies
suggest that government, business, and financial sectors should care about the potentially
destabilizing role of climate policies aimed at reaching the 2°C target through the so-called
carbon stranded assets (Caldecott and McDaniels 2014; Leaton 2012). The climate Value-at-
Risk due to climate policy shocks could be relevant for individual pension funds and
investment funds through their holdings in climate- policy-relevant sectors (Battiston et al.
2017).
In contrast, in order for prices to adjust smoothly, market participants would need common
ways to assess both their own portfolio exposure to climate risk, as well as each other’s market
share. While better disclosure of climate-related financial information would not fully resolve
the uncertainty stemming from these three sources of shocks, it would certainly make
information less imperfect. Yet, the inability for market players to fully anticipate price
adjustments implies that many actors could accumulate substantial unintentional exposures.
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Here, an important gap is represented by the lack of concise and comparable indicators of
portfolio’s exposure to transition risk that fails to provide investors with the right incentives to
reallocate their portfolio.
A second limiting factor for market-based solutions to climate change arises from the fact
that their functioning requires that market participants can assess their own market share and
the one of their competitors, and that regulators can access such information. For instance, in
the context of perfect competition, market-based solutions require that the market power of
participants and in particular of incumbent players is known and negligible. This, in turn,
implies that their market share should be not too large. The presence of market power could
prevent markets to work as intended: for instance, in the energy market, it could adversely
affect the operation of the electricity system by inducing distortions of energy price signals,
resulting in inefficient investment decisions (Twomey et al. 2005). In addition, the presence of
market power is relevant for policy makers and regulators because it could substantially
undermine the intended benefits from changes in regulation. The optimal level of environ-
mental regulations (such as the introduction of a carbon tax) to mitigate the cost of climate
change has been widely debated in the context of perfect competition, with some scholars
advocating more restrictive (Stern 2009) or more gradual interventions (Nordhaus 2007).
Acemoglu et al. (2012) showed that market-based solutions to climate change could work
also in the presence of energy sector monopoly and put the attention on the price effects on the
direction of technical change. An implicit assumption of all these models is that market
participants are able to assess their own market share as well as their competitors, since this
is a crucial variable in determining decisions to enter or leave the market, as well as the
portfolio’s reallocation strategies. However, in the context of the transition to a low-carbon
economy, it is not clear how to measure the market share of participants because financial
actors invest at the same time in many economic sectors, which are potentially exposed to
climate risk via the GHG emissions that they either produce directly or induce along the supply
chain. As a result, the lack of common and concise measures of the relevant market share
hampers both the ability of policy makers to introduce effective market regulations and
competition policies, and the ability of mainstream investors to assess the possible effects of
their own and their competitors’ portfolio reallocation.
In order to fill in these two gaps, we propose two novel and complementary indices to
characterize a financial actor’s portfolio: (i) its BGHG exposure,^ capturing the exposure of the
portfolio to climate transition risks, and (ii) its BGHG holding,^ capturing the market share of
each financial actor weighted by its contribution to GHG emissions. By looking at these two
dimensions simultaneously, we can identify those actors who are, at the same time, the most
exposed to climate risks, and who are likely to have the largest influence both on price
adjustments in the low-carbon transition and on the introduction of decarbonization policies.
We illustrate the policy insights that can be derived from the empirical application of these
indices by combining GHG emissions data by country and economic sector (at the level of 1-
digit Nace Rev2 classification), with a dataset of portfolios of equity holdings and loans in the
17 countries that composed the Euro-Area in 2014, extracted from the Bureau Van Dijk (BvD)
ORBIS database, and with loan data at the sector level obtained from the European Central
Bank (ECB) data warehouse. The two indices help to inform the discussion on the introduction
of a stable framework of incentives that would encourage the divestment from carbon-
intensive sectors and decrease the downside risk of low-carbon investment (also called de-
risking). Such an incentive framework would make the achievement of the COP21’s target
more likely and would reduce the risk for financial actors, governments, and citizens.
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2 Data and methods
2.1 Data description
2.1.1 Financial data
To run our analysis, we use the data provided by the Orbis/BvD database from which we
selected 2804 listed companies and 11,488 shareholders with consolidated accounts for the 17
Euro-Area countries for year 2014 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Spain), for a total of 27,955 equity holdings relationships. The Orbis/BvD
database includes equity holdings of financial investors in listed companies recorded at the end
of the accounting year, for the last year available. The Orbis/BvD classifies financial actors
through the Shareholder Bureau Van Dijk (BvD Type) data field into standardized institutional
categories. However, this classification does not perfectly match the traditional taxonomy of
institutional investors. Banks and investment funds are often classified differently: e.g.,
Blackrock Inc. is considered a bank instead of an asset manager. In addition, in the case of
asset managers (such as Blackrock Inc.), the data do not reliably distinguish between assets
owned and assets under management (i.e., managed for other owners). In order to overcome
these issues, we have reclassified financial actors according to the European Systems of
Accounts (ESA 2010) classification of shareholders into standardized institutional categories.
We obtained eight groups of financial actors: Banks, Other credit institutions (risk pooling and
contractual savings institutions), Investment funds, Insurance and pension funds, Other finan-
cial services (e.g., foundations and research institutes), Industrial companies, Governments,
and Individuals (e.g., private shareholders). The exposures of the groups of financial actors can
be decomposed along the main types of financial instruments such as loans (e.g., non-tradable
debt securities), bond holdings (e.g., tradable debt securities), and equity holdings (e.g.,
ownership shares including both those tradable on the stock market and those non-tradable).
In the Euro-Area, loans, equity share, and debt securities represent a total of 88% of
financial assets in 2015. Loans account for 38% (i.e., 53.2 trn EUR) of total assets, equity
holdings (listed) for 33% (i.e., 40.6 trn EUR), and bonds for 17% (i.e., 21 trn EUR)
(ECB data warehouse). Therefore, by focusing on loans and equity holdings, we cover
more than two-thirds of the Euro-Area assets. Equity holdings in listed companies are the
initial focus of our analysis because their information is the most accessible (including the
identity of the owners, which is not the case for bonds). In addition, they are less likely
to suffer from the bias of overrepresentation of big companies, which could affect the
data on equity holdings in non-listed companies. From these data, we derive the relevant
information on investors’ exposure to listed companies by sector of economic activity and
by year. Equity holdings represent 44% (4139.3 billion (bn) EUR) of investment fund’s
(IF’s) total assets, which are equal to 9426.2 bn EUR, and 54% (1177.7 bn EUR) of
pension fund’s (PF’s) total assets, which are equal to 2160.7 bn EUR. Loans to non-
financial corporations (NFC) represent a small but non-zero share of IF and PF’s
portfolios, respectively 6.2% (584.5 bn EUR) and 3% (64.6 bn EUR). In contrast, and
not surprisingly, Banks (monetary financial institutions, MFIs), which have the highest
value of total assets with 31,195.4 bn EUR in the Euro-Area in 2014, have the largest
exposure in loans to NFC that represent 13.8% (4315.9 bn EUR) of banks’ total assets
(31,195.4 bn EUR, see Table A1).
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In addition, we consider data on Euro-Area banks’ loans to listed companies made available
by the ECB data warehouse, which provides harmonized balance sheets of all MFIs that are
resident in the Euro-Area, including inter-MFI positions on a gross basis, according to the
Regulation ECB/2008/32. According to the ECB data warehouse definition, MFIs include the
Euro-Area-resident credit institutions (as defined in the European Union (EU) law) and all
other resident financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substi-
tutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic
terms), to grant credit and/or invest in securities. Banks’ loans breakdown by NACE Rev2
sectors of economic activity is less granular than in the case of equity holdings: aggregation
occurs for sectors D and E, H and J, and L, M, and N.
2.1.2 GHG emissions data and sectors of economic activity
Because our analysis focuses on the Euro-Area, we use the annual GHG inventory report
compiled by the European Environment Agency (EEA) on behalf of the EU and made
available on the Eurostat database. Estimates of GHG emissions are produced for NACE
Rev2 sectors of economic activity according to the technological source of emissions,
following the IPCC’s recommendations.
We include CO2 emissions, Methane emissions in CO2 equivalents, and Nitrous
oxide emissions in CO2 equivalents for each NACE Rev2 sector of economic activity
per each country of the EU, in thousand tonnes. We then aggregate the values for the
17 countries which belonged to the Euro-Area in 2014. We consider only Scope 1
(direct) GHG emissions because data are mostly available, in comparison to Scope 2
(indirect emissions) and Scope 3 (induced emissions). We follow the classification of
economic sectors called NACE Rev2 (Nomenclature statistique des activités
économiques dans la Communauté européenne), which is adopted by Eurostat to
classify the economic activities in the EU at a 4-digit level. Sectors are listed from
A—Agriculture, forestry, and fishing to U—Activities of extraterritorial organizations
and bodies. We consider sectors of economic activity from A—Agriculture, forestry,
and fishing to L—Real estate activities because they represent the most of GHG
emissions in CO2 equivalent on the total (96.29%) in 2014 (see Table 2 Sector D—
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply is responsible for the most of the
emissions in 2014 (694,986.503 thousand tonnes) followed by sector C—Manufactur-
ing (602,048.885 thousand tonnes) and by sector A—Agriculture (352,471.288 thou-
sand tonnes).
2.2 Definition of the indices
We develop two complementary indices that allow us to analyze two main dimensions
of investors’ exposure to climate risk, providing a systemic overview of the relation
between financial exposure and GHG emissions across financial actors. For each
NACE Rev2 economic sector j, we compute its share Sj of GHG emissions out of
the total GHG emissions from all economic activities in the Euro-Area in 2014. Let
us now consider the equity holdings portfolios. For a given financial actor i owning
equity holdings in the sector j for an monetary value Aij, we compute its relative
exposure to each economic sector j, Wij = Aij/∑lAil, where the index l runs over the set
of all the sectors. Notice that by construction, it holds ΣWij = 1. The BGHG
Climatic Change
exposure^ index (EEi) is defined as the sum of the relative exposures of the actor i
across economic sectors weighted by the relative share of emissions of each sector:
EEi ¼ ∑ jS jWij:
For instance, an investor with a portfolio entirely concentrated on sector D—Electricity, etc.
has a value of the index EEi higher than an investor with a portfolio concentrated on K—
Financial, etc. because the share of emissions of sector D is higher than that of sector K. The
BGHG exposure^ index captures the GHG emissions intensity of the portfolio of each financial
actor according to the sectors to which it is most exposed and according to the emission shares
of those sectors. The extension of this formula to the case of banks’ loans is straightforward.
We also compute the market share of each actor i in each sector j as Mij = Aij/∑kAkj, where the
index k runs over the set of all the actors. The BGHG holding^ index is defined as the sum of
the market shares of the actor i across economic sectors, weighted by the relative share of
emissions of each sector:
EHi ¼ ∑ jS jMij:
The BGHG holding^ index EHi captures the share of the GHG emissions Bheld^ by each
financial actor across all economic sectors and in comparison with the totality of actors k.
Our approach allows us to explore two complementary and fundamental dimensions of
investors’ portfolios in relation to climate risk. The first dimension addresses the question of
how much is each financial actor exposed to climate risk through its portfolio, given the GHG
emissions represented by its assets. It captures the share (and value) of financial actors’
portfolios that is at risk of stranding in the case of abrupt adjustment of asset prices. The
second dimension addresses the question of what are the GHG emissions that each financial
actor Bholds^ through its portfolio in relation to the other actors. It captures the relative
importance of financial actors in decarbonization paths, showing who are the key financial
actors in terms of both their market share and the value of the GHG emissions they could
Bmove^ in response to the introduction of either decarbonization policies or green incentives.
3 Results
3.1 Empirical results
The value of the total market capitalization of equity holdings of listed companies in the 17
countries of the Euro-Area in 2014 is 2,936,351,029,3 thousand USD, with highest values
owned by Industrial companies (1,020,185,951,000 USD), Investment funds
(801,178,754,200 USD), and Banks (347,640,118,000 USD).
The highest equity portfolios’ exposure to NACE Rev2 sectors for all actors’ portfolios in
the Euro-Area in 2014 is on sector C Manufacturing, with peaks for Individuals (75.56% of
their equity portfolio) and Industrial companies (55.53%). Insurance and pension funds, as
well as Banks, are mostly exposed to sector K Financial and insurance activities, respectively
for 56.95 and 36.82% of their equity portfolio. The lowest exposure of all financial actors’
equity portfolios is on sector A Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, as a result of companies’ low
market capitalization. The value of each financial actor equity holdings’ portfolio by sector of
activity is reported in Table A2.
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Table 1 shows the market share of each financial actor’s type in each sector of economic
activity, as well as the total market share of each financial actor’s equity portfolio. Industrial
companies and Investment funds have the highest total market share, respectively 35 and 27%
of the total. The highest market share, normalized by total exposure of all financial actors,
belongs to Industrial companies in sectors I Accommodation and food service activities (59%)
and E Water supply, sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities (46%).
Table 2 shows the breakdown of GHG emissions by NACE Rev2 sector of economic
activity for the 17 Euro-Area countries considered. The most GHG-intense sectors according
to the Eurostat Scope 1 classification are sector D Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning
supply (30.65% of total GHG emissions in CO2 equivalent), followed by sector C Manufactur-
ing (26.55%) and sector A Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (15.55%).
Table 3 shows the equity portfolios’ exposure to NACE Rev2 sectors for each financial
actor in the Euro-Area in 2014. The most exposed actors to sector D, which records the highest
GHG emissions’ intensity (see Table 2), are governments (39.5% of their equity), mostly
through their ownership or participation in utility and extraction companies. In contrast,
individual families and industrial companies record the highest equity portfolio’s exposure
to sector C (respectively 75.6% and 55.4%). The lowest equity portfolios’ exposure is on
sector A—Agriculture, for all financial actors.
The information provided in Tables 1, 2, and 3 is used to compute the two indices, whose
results are then displayed in Table 4, which reports the results of the GHG emissions exposure
index calculated for each financial actor, and the GHG emissions holding index. Governments,
individuals, and investment funds’ portfolios display the highest GHG emissions exposure
(BGHG exposure index^), while Industrial companies and Investment funds have the highest
market share of GHG emissions (BGHG holding index^).
Figure 1 plots the GHG holding index versus the GHG exposure index. GHG exposure and
GHG holding are two complementary and yet fundamental dimensions of climate transition
risk. Indeed, actors in the top-right quadrant are those who are at the same time most exposed
to GHG emissions and most likely to have a large impact on the market if they were to
reallocate their portfolios in order to avoid stranded assets. In the data considered in our first
exercise, i.e., equity holdings of the Euro-Area, both indices display heterogeneity across
financial actors’ types. Governments have the highest GHG exposure (0.211) but play a minor
role on financial markets in terms of total market share. Indeed, the size of Governments’
bubble is much smaller than that of Industrial companies. The latter emerges as a key
stakeholder, as a result of its high GHG exposure combined with its even higher GHG holding
due to its total market share. Governments’ position on the graph reflects the concentration of
exposure in sectors with high GHG emissions share (such as sector C Manufacturing and D
Electricity, etc.). Similar to Governments, Individuals display high values for the GHG
exposure index (0.200) but have relatively low values for the GHG holding, as a consequence
of their lower market share. Their GHG exposure index is also driven by their high portfolio’s
exposure to sector C and sector D. Investment funds are the other key financial actor
(displayed by the second-sized bubble), and their result is driven by the value of the GHG
holding index (0.225) and their total market share. For both Industrial companies and
Investment funds, their high market share i.e., the financial weight on the equity market
contributes to the final result.
The information provided by the two indices captures the complexity of climate policies.
For instance, Industrial companies and Investment funds are very different according to their
business type and thus would require different policy incentives for divestment from carbon
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assets. It would be easier and faster for Investment funds to reallocate their equity holdings than
it would be for Industrial companies. Indeed, for Industrial companies, equity holdings typically
represent shares of ownership in subsidiaries operating also in their core business sector.
Table A5 in the Appendix reports the values of the GHG exposure index for commer-
cial banks based on their loans to non-financial corporations (NFC) in 2014. The contributions
to the index values are computed for each sector of economic activity. The highest contribution
comes from sector C and the lowest from sector B. The latter result can be explained by the
low level of reliance of mining and fossil fuel extraction companies on credit loans in the Euro-
Area in 2014. The GHG exposure index calculated on banks’ loan portfolio is lower than the
same value calculated on banks’ equity portfolio, respectively 0.074 and 0.091. The difference
comes from the different allocation of banks’ loans and equity holdings across sectors (for
instance, banks lend more to real estate than they hold in real estate’s equity).
3.2 Discussion around data availability and implications for results
The methodology proposed in this article has a general validity and can be applied to a generic
dataset of portfolios for which the economic sectors of the investments are known. However,
Table 2 Share of GHG emissions (in CO2 equivalents) by NACE Rev2 sector in the Euro-Area, 2014. Source:
Eurostat. The NACE Rev2 sectors not included in the table represent only roughly 3.7% of GHG emissions and
include professional activities, teaching, and services. We excluded them from our analysis
Sector NACE Rev2 1-digit level GHG emissions share (%)
A—Agriculture, forestry and fishing 15.55
B—Mining and quarrying 0.96
C—Manufacturing 26.55
D—Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply 30.65
E—Water supply, sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities 5.24
F—Construction 1.45
G—Wholesale and retail trade, and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2.03
H—Transportation and storage 12.73
I—Accommodation and food service activities 0.53
J—Information and communication 0.28
K—Financial and insurance activities 0.20
L—Real estate activities 0.12
Total 96.29
Table 3 Financial actors’ equity exposure in each NACE Rev2 sector of economic activity, as a percentage of
each financial actor’s total equity portfolio. The financial actors’ types are reported in the rows, while the NACE
Rev2 sectors of economic activity are reported in the columns. Source: own elaborations on Orbis/BvD data,
2014
Financial actor/NACE Rev2 sector A B C D E F G H I J K L Total
Banks 0 5.69 31.8 4.86 0.7 2.6 1.7 1.53 0.6 11.2 36.8 2.5 100
Other credit institutions 0.1 10.7 30.2 6.37 1.2 2.7 1.8 11.2 0.2 15.2 18.3 2.1 100
Investment funds 0.1 2.8 55.4 4.68 0.4 3.7 4.7 4.52 0.7 10 11.4 1.6 100
Insurance and pension funds 0.1 2.03 34.4 2.37 0.4 2.8 2.2 2.17 0.5 8.13 37.9 7.1 100
Other financial services 2 1.59 28.1 0.84 0 2.1 5.1 0.49 0 2.19 57 0.6 100
Industrial companies 0.3 3.27 55.5 5.51 0.8 3.3 4 4.74 1.4 10.5 8.13 2.6 100
Governments 0 4.03 29 39.5 1.1 0.2 0.2 9.75 0.1 11.7 4.15 0.3 100
Individuals 0.8 0.21 75.6 0.96 0 2.2 2.2 2.56 0.6 9.9 3.34 1.7 100
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data availability represented a main issue for our analysis. In particular, the accuracy of the
results would certainly benefit from a more granular and standardized disclosure of financial
information on investors’ portfolios. To this end, and in line with the recommendations of the
European Commission’s High Level Experts Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG 2017),
public funding could be devoted to the creation of an open database containing granular data
on exposures of financial actors to sectors of economic activity and emissions. Such invest-
ment would allow researchers to carry out more-detailed analyses and to replicate more easily
the previous results, supporting the development of better metrics and methods for climate-
related financial disclosure advocated by the G20’s FSB TCFD (2017).
As regards financial data from the BvD ORBIS database, we encountered the following
issues. Entities classified as persons or families (which account for circa 30% of shareholders)
do not have a NACE code and have been classified as Individuals. Then, different equity
holdings may be recorded as owned by economic entities, corresponding to different business
arms (e.g., the Goldman Sachs group comprises a banking arm as well as investment funds)
belonging to the same business group. We have kept the ownership at the level of consolida-
tion that was provided in the data because our aim in this analysis is to aggregate the holdings
in terms of institutional sectors. We are not interested here in aggregating them by business
Table 4 The GHG exposure index and the GHG holding index. The table reports the values of the GHG
emissions exposure index and the GHG emissions holding index calculated for each financial actor across sectors
(for a breakdown of the indices by sector, see Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix)
Financial actor/indices GHG exposure index (EE) GHG holding index (EH)
Banks 0.101 0.070
Other credit institutions 0.116 0.046
Investment funds 0.166 0.225
Insurance and pension funds 0.095 0.027
Other financial services 0.083 0.054
Industrial companies 0.168 0.352
Governments 0.211 0.114
Individuals 0.200 0.075
Fig. 1 Bubble chart of the two indices for several aggregated financial actors. X-axis: GHG exposure index. Y-
axis: GHG holding index. The size of the bubble is proportional to the market share of each financial actor type
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groups. However, the way in which BvD ORBIS classifies shareholders from the financial
sectors into banks, investment funds, and hedge funds is sometimes unsuited for our analysis
(e.g., some asset managers are classified as banks). Therefore, whenever the NACE code of the
shareholder was available, we have reclassified them into institutional sectors (e.g., banks,
investment funds) following as closely as possible the ESA 2010 standards. The detailed
correspondence is reported in Table A8 of the Appendix.
We have focused here on data of the Euro-Area because value and allocation of shares for
investors from several countries, in particular from China and Russia, suffers from under-
reporting issues.
Debt securities are important when we look at governments, pension funds, and banks’
direct exposure. Banks alone in the Euro-Area hold government bonds for 1.7 trn EUR and
corporate bonds for EUR 1.3 trn (ECB data warehouse). However, the information on the
economic sector of the issuer of debt securities owned by financial actors are not provided.
This is an important limitation for the analysis of exposures because the expansionary
monetary policy, enforced by the ECB through its Long Term Refinancing Operation first,
and the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy since June 2016 target specifically the purchase of
corporate debt securities. It would be desirable that this information could be made available in
the next future.
Data on GHG emissions by sector of companies’ economic activities at the NACE 2-digit
code aggregation are provided by Eurostat only until 2014. In our analysis, we have used the
information on the contribution of each economic sector to the total GHG emissions at the
Euro-Area level. In principle, one could use the contribution of each sector at the country level.
However, Scope 1 and Scope 2 data underestimate the role that the sector B-Mining and
quarrying-plays on global emissions. Indeed, sector B is indirectly responsible for CO2
emissions in the atmosphere through the use of fossil fuels an input for production by the
other sectors of economic activity, in particular transport, utility, housing, and energy-intensive
sectors such as manufacturing. Improving GHG emissions tracking and reporting from fossil
fuel extraction sectors is fundamental to assess the sector’s exposure to carbon stranded assets,
and the carbon intensity of investors’ portfolios (see for instance the 2 Degrees Investing
Initiative’s (2015) campaign on investors’ climate disclosure, the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) Guidelines and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 2011). Finally, the level of
aggregation of the NACE Rev2 classification of economic activities for which GHG emissions
are available hides the heterogeneity of the contribution of different activities classified within
the same sector to GHG emissions. For instance, sector C-Manufacturing, which contributes to
26% circa of cumulative CO2 emissions, includes a very broad range of activities such as
Manufacture of food products, beverages, and tobacco products (CA), Manufacture of coke
and refined petroleum products (CD), and Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical
products (CI), which at the current stage, cannot be disentangled.
4 Conclusion
The G20’s FSB TCFD has identified a key information gap for the introduction of effective
market-based solutions to climate change, i.e., the need for better disclosure on business and
financial actors’ exposure to climate risk. However, even in the presence of more granular and
systematic information, the lack of concise and comparable indicators to measure the main
economic variables required by market participants to make their decisions, constitutes an
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additional informational gap that need to be addressed. As the two most critical dimensions for
market participants, we have focused on the problem of measuring their vulnerability, in terms
of exposures of their portfolios to climate transition risk, and their relevance, in terms of their
effective market share, in the context of the low-carbon transition. To this end, we have
introduced a GHG exposure index that weighs the exposure of the portfolio to the various
sectors by the contribution of the sector to the GHG emissions. We have also introduced a
GHG holding index that weighs the market share of the portfolio in each sector by the
contribution of the sector to the GHG emissions.
We arewell aware of the issues in the estimations of theGHGemissions of each sector of activity,
including the fact that emissions induced by a sector such as B in the supply chain is currently not
taken into account. We are also aware of the issues in the classification of complex economic
activities into a specific sector in order to assign them a level of contribution to GHG emissions. Yet,
these two indices have the advantage that they can be easily computed in a standardized fashion by
all market participants and regulators. Therefore, they have the potential to set an initial and
commonly agreed benchmark for the evaluation of portfolios and market strategy decisions. This
benchmark can then be refined, when new, and more granular information becomes available.
In this paper, we have illustrated the use of the two indices on a data set covering equity holdings
and bank loans in the Euro-Area in 2014. Industrial companies and Investment funds emerge as key
stakeholders in our dataset because they are at the same time vulnerable and yet relevant. Indeed,
they have high levels ofGHGexposure but also high levels ofGHGholding because, as institutional
sectors, they have the largest market share in several carbon-intense sectors. Investment funds,
however, typically manage funds on behalf of clients, and in particular, to a large extent, of pension
funds. Thus, the potential loss deriving from stranded assets in GHG-intensive sectors could end up
affecting households through pension funds and pension schemes. This is a relevant insight in the
discussion on market-based solution to climate change. We also found that Governments have the
highest level of GHG exposure, through their portfolio of equity holdings on sector D-Electricity,
etc. This result highlights the contradiction between governments’ commitments to the COP21’s
target and their current exposure to carbon-intense assets. It follows that governments could play a
key role in promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy by greening their own portfolios.
When looking at the contributions to the GHG exposure index, we see that all financial actors are
exposed to sector C-Manufacturing, and sector D-Electricity, etc., which are the most relevant
sectors in terms of GHG emissions. Therefore, the introduction of incentives targeting these sectors
could contribute to mobilize capital into low-carbon investments, creating opportunities for profits
from divesting from carbon-intense assets. This would helpmitigating the negative effects of climate
transition risks on the potential Blosers,^ making low-carbon transition solutions acceptable for
them.
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